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CRIMINAL LAW: FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE
SECTION 1001 CONSTRUED TO CONTAIN
TWO DISTINCT OFFENSES
SECTION 1001 of the Criminal Code provides criminal sanctions
against persons who deal fraudulently with government agencies.1
Although the origin of the statute dates from 1863,2 only recently
have Government attorneys made frequent use of its provisions.
In United States v. Diogo,4 the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit supplemented the increasing body of judicial interpretation
of section 1001 by examining a new point of discussion and resolving
it in a questionable manner.
The defendant5 was an alien who contracted a sham marriage
'18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1958): "Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any
department or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals
or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false,
fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false
writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent
statement or entry, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both."
2 The original form of the statute appeared in the Act of March 2, 1863, ch. 67,
12 Stat. 696. It was subsequently collected and revised in REv. STAT. § 5438 (1875),
and later included in the Criminal Code of 1909, ch. 321, § 35, 35 Stat. 1095. In
1948, that section, as amended and embodied in 18 U.S.C. § 80 (1940), was divided
into two parts in the Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, §§ 287, 1001, 62 Stat. 698, 749.
The relevant current codification is 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1958).
3During the last ten years, federal courts in New York alone have witnessed a
wide variety of prosecutions based on § 1001. Government agencies involved have
included: Armed Services Medical Procurement Agency, United States v. Private Brands,
Inc., 250 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 957 (1958); Civil Service
Commission, United States v. Salazar, 293 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1961); Department of
Commerce, United States v. Sorkin, 275 F.2d 330 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 362 U.S.
989 (1960); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, United States v. Kaskel, 23 F.R.D.
152 (E.D.N.Y. 1959); Immigration and Naturalization Service, United States v. Lange,
128 F. Supp. 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Internal Revenue Service, United States v. Curcio,
279 F.2d 681 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 824 (1960); Post Office Department,
United States v. Baumgarten, 300 F.2d 807 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 917
(1962); Treasury Department, United States v. Miller, 246 F.2d 486 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 905 (1957); United States Army, United States v. Fabric Garment Co.,
262 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 989 (1959); United States Assay Office,
United States v. Sheba Bracelets, Inc., 248 F.2d 134 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
904 (1957); United States Coast Guard, United States v. McQuade, 119 F. Supp. 742
(E.D.N.Y. 1954); United States Navy, United States v. Greenburg, 268 F.2d 120 (2d Cir.
1959).
4 320 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1963).
'The facts related here are those which a jury could have found with regard to
the defendant Diogo. The facts of the cases against other defendants, Gonzales and
Costa, are not included.
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with a citizen of the United States in order to obtain non-quota
immigrant status.6 The parties were married in New Jersey pur-
suant to an agreement whereby the citizen would be paid a sum of
money and there would be no sexual relations between them.
Thereafter, Diogo represented his change in marital status to the
Immigration and Naturalization Service and, consequently, was
granted the non-quota status. Nine months after the marriage,
never having lived together as husband and wife, the couple ob-
tained a Mexican divorce. Under section 1001,7 the Immigration
and Naturalization Service obtained a conviction of Diogo for wil-
fully making "false, fictitious and fraudulent statements and repre-
sentations" with respect to his marital status.8
The Court of Appeals reversed on what it termed a "well estab-
lished" interpretation of section 1001-that the section contains two
distinct offenses, each of which requires different proof to sustain
a conviction.9 The court reasoned that on the one hand, the offense
of "concealment of a material fact" requires proof of wilful non-
disclosure by means of a trick, scheme, or device. On the other
hand, "false representation" requires proof of some type of actual
falsity. Applying this interpretation to the situation presented in
Diogo, the court construed the indictment for "false, fictitious or
fraudulent statements or representations" to be in substance a charge
of the offense of "false representations" 10 requiring proof of actual
falsity. Since the couple was married according to the law of New
Jersey, the court found no actual falsity in Diogo's representations.11
1 Immigration and Nationality Act § 101 (a) (27) (A), 66 Stat. 169 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §
1101 (a) (27) (A) (1958). A non-quota immigrant may enter the United States without
regard to the numerical limitation placed on persons of his national origin.
7The defendants were convicted under three statutes: 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1958), 18
U.S.C. § 1546 (1958) (false statement in application for visa), and 18 U.S.C. § 371
(1958) (conspiracy to commit an offense or to defraud the United States). The Court
of Appeals pointed out that the cornerstone of the charges was violation of § 1001,
and its decision treats that charge alone. 320 F.2d at 902.
8 See counts two, three and four of the indictment.
0 320 F.2d at 902.
10 This construction of the indictment was apparently conceded during the argu-
ment on appeal. 820 F.2d at 902. In view of the costliness of this concession, one
wonders if the prosecution contested this point sufficiently. It seems legitimately
arguable that the indictment for "false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or repre-
sentations" contained charges of both actual falsity and wilful nondisclosure. Actual
falsity is self-evident in the words "false... statements," and wilful nondisclosure
could be implied from the words "fraudulent... representations." See note 81 infra.
I8 320 F.2d at 905-07. In the court's view, since proof of actual falsity must
be made when the indictment is for false representations, the jury must find both
that the statements were literally false and that Diogo knew them to be false. The
Vol. 1964: 384]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
The court distinguished two almost identical cases on which the
Government had relied most heavily12 and implied that although a
conviction might have been obtained on an indictment for the
offense of "concealment of a material fact,"'1 the indictment did not
charge that offense. This "variance" between the pleading and
proof appears to be the primary basis of the reversal.14
The sufficiency of a pleading is tested by settled principles which
require that an indictment fulfill two distinct purposes. 1 First,
the pleading must clearly depict the offense being charged so that
the accused may impose a plea of former jeopardy in the face of a
subsequent prosecution for the same offense. Secondly, the accused
court noted that the statement by Diogo that he was married could be interpreted
as either true or false, i.e. that he was married according to the law of his domicile
or that he was married with the intent of establishing a life together with his
spouse as Congress undoubtedly intended in the Immigration and Nationality Act.
Because of this ambiguity on the face of the representations, the necessary actual
falsity depended solely on Diogo's intent at the time he made the statment. The
court apparently felt that there was not enough evidence as to Diogo's intent at
that time to justify the verdict below.
-12 Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953); United States v. Rubenstein, 151
F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1945). In both cases the convictions were upheld, but the court
pointed out that in each, concealment as well as false representation was charged.
The court in Diogo concluded: "We do not read [Lutwak] to suggest that a prosecution
for false representations can be grounded upon the omission of an explanation, which
omission only carries with it 'implications of a state of facts which were not ...
true.' To so hold would be to distort the language of the statute and assimilate
the separate offense of concealment into the different one of false representations
solely because of a similarity of prohibited objectives." 320 F.2d at 905. (Emphasis
in original.)
13By distinguishing Lutwak and Rubenstein on the ground that in both of them
the offense of concealment of a material fact was charged, the court implied that
if concealment had been charged in Diogo, the result would have been governed by
Lutwak and Rubenstein. 320 F.2d at 905. Apparently, the court's theory would
be that when the indictment is for concealment of a material fact, the jury is con-
cerned with finding first that a material fact has not been disclosed, and secondly,
that the defendant intended not to disclose it. Since there was no doubt in Diogo
as to a material fact not being disclosed, the sole question would have been the
"wilfulness" of the nondisclosure, and the court appeared willing to let the jury de-
cide that question. The distinction between such a situation and the actual case
appears to lie in the fact that the first of the two required findings could have been
made in a "concealment" situation, but in the actual case, there was not sufficient
evidence to support the first required finding of actual falsity.
4320 F.2d at 902. Near the end of its opinion, the court suggested an additional
reason for its decision when it rejected the Government's argument that the conviction
should be affirmed on a theory of concealment if there is a failure to prove false
representations. "Even assuming that the variance between pleading and proof did
not prejudice appellants' interests, the... trial judge failed entirely to instruct the
jury on ... [the concealment] theory of the case." Id. at 909.
The dissenting judge believed that even the failure of the trial judge to instruct
the jury on the concealment theory did not result in prejudice to the appellants.
In his view, both issues were clearly raised by the proof. Id. at 910.15E.g., Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-64 (1962), and cases cited therein.
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must be provided with sufficient particular information concerning
the offense charged to enable him to prepare an adequate defense.
It seems that the court in Diogo was concerned about the suf-
ficiency of the indictment with regard to the first of the two re-
quirements: that it protect the accused from double jeopardy.16
This is indicated by the fact that all of the cases cited by the court
as authority for the two-offense construction deal with the problem
of jeopardy.17 Those cases indicate that the Diogo court correctly
discerned the applicable principle for determining when two of-
fenses exist for the purposes of double jeopardy. As set forth in
Blockburger v. United States,'s that principle states that "where the
same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statu-
ory provisions, the test to be applied in determining whether there
is one or two offenses is whether each provision requires proof of an
additional fact which the other does not."'9
Several considerations indicate that even under the Blockburger
test which the court adopts, the two-offense theory of section 1001 is
tenuous. Upon examination of the terms "false representations"
and "concealment," it seems that the only legitimate distinction
10 As pointed out in note 14 supra, however, the court also indicated concern over
the fact that some prejudice toward the defendants may have occurred even if the
deficiencies in the indictment were overlooked. If this were the sole basis for the
court's decision, no legal questions would be raised by the case since such prejudice
is a matter of discretion for the trial judge. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750
(1946). However, this aspect of the case appears to be of secondary importance to
the court.
'
7fBoth United States v. Uram, 148 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1945), and United States v.
Kenny, 236 F.2d 128 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 894 (1956), involved questions
of how many crimes were charged in the various counts of the indictments. In
Uram, the defendant was claiming an unjustified double punishment; in Kenny, double
jeopardy. However, United States v. Lange, 128 F. Supp. 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), does
not deal with double jeopardy, but it offers only token support for a two-offense
construction of the section. It is one of a rash of cases which consider it significant
that the wording of the statute includes the words "material fact" only in connection
with the "concealment" clause. The unfortunate conclusion often drawn from this
observation is that materiality need not be proved if the indictment is in terms of
the "false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or representation" clause. Such con-
clusions fail to appreciate the fact that the word "fraudulent" does appear in con-
nection with the other clauses of § 1001, and fraud necessarily involves materiality.
See Twachtman v. Connelly, 106 F.2d 501, 506 (6th Cir. 1939). The majority of cases
hold that materiality must always be an element of an offense under § 1001. Gonzales
v. United States, 286 F.2d 118, 120 n.2 (10th Cir. 1960).
18 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
"Old. at 304. Both Uram and Kenny can be traced to the Blockburger principle.
The Uram case cites Blockburger itself, while the Kenny case follows a more indirect
route. Kenny cites Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575 (1948), which in turn relies
on Pinkerton v. UnitEd States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946). Pinkerton cites Gavieres v.
United States, 220 U.S. 338 (1911), which is relied on in Blockburger. 284 U.S. at 304.
Vol. 1964: 384]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
which can be drawn between the two concepts is that a false repre-
sentation requires an affirmative act while a concealment does not.
A fact may be concealed without its being falsely represented. On
the other hand, it is logically impossible to have a false representa-
tion without having a concealment at the same time because the
true version of whatever facts are falsely represented must necessarily
be concealed by the act itself. In fact, there seems to be no element
of proof necessary to prove "concealment of a material fact" which
is not also essential to prove "false representation"; so that, if the
offense of false representation is proved, it seems that the offense of
concealment of a material fact is proved by implication. 20 Clearly,
this does not meet the test laid down in Blockburger that each of-
fense, not just one of them, contain some element not required in
the other. By this analysis of the Blockburger rule, it would appear
that whenever a defendant is prosecuted a second time under section
1001, he could successfully interpose a plea of former jeopardy. In
other words, for purposes of double jeopardy, section 1001 contains
but one offense. 21
Furthermore, congressional and judicial treatment of section
1001 and its forerunners further indicate that the statute is not to
be narrowly construed as it must be under a two-offense theory.
The 1948 revision of the Criminal Code22 severed what is now
section 1001 from section 80 of the Criminal Code of 1940.23 Sec-
tion 80 was a specific enumeration of various offenses which fell
20 To paraphrase the court's words in Diogo, it would seem that proof of "actual
falsity" would necessarily include a proof of "wilful nondisclosure by means of a
trick, scheme or device." To hold otherwise, one would have to say that an outright
falsehood does not constitute a trick, scheme or device. Such a narrow construction
of those words seems hardly tenable.
21A similar test for identity of offenses is referred to as the "same evidence" test,
whereby a second prosecution may be defeated by a plea of former jeopardy if the
first indictment were such that a conviction could have been had upon proof of
the facts contained in the second indictment. Burton v. United States, 202 U.S.
344, 380 (1906); HALL, CRIMINAL LAiW AND PROCEDURE 902 (1949). See generally,
id. at 902-06. A significant difference between the "same evidence" test and the
Blockburger test may be seen in a situation where a defendant who has already been
tried on a theory of false representations is prosecuted again on a concealment
theory. As has been pointed out, a correct application of the Blockburger test would
allow a plea of double jeopardy. On the other hand, application of the "same
evidence" test would preclude a plea of double jeopardy, since (as the court in
Diogo pointed out) proof of the elements of a concealment is not sufficient to convict
on an indictment for false representations. This consideration suggests that perhaps
the court in Diogo, although purporting to apply the Blockburger test, was in reality
applying the "same evidence" test.
22 Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 683, 18 U.S.C. (1958).
23 Act of April 4, 1938, ch. 69, § 35 (a), cI. 1-2, 52 Stat. 197.
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under a general heading of false claims against the Government.
The second clause of section 80 became section 1001 under the
heading: "Statements or entries generally." The wording of that
clause consists of a logical breakdown in the possible means by which
a fraud might be perpetrated. 24 It is arguable that by enacting these
words in a separate section of the revision, Congress intended to
acknowledge the contrast between this broad language and the
specific provisions in section 80.25 It seems that the intention was
not so much to enumerate specific offenses as it was to define a
single, broad offense. Judicial decisions have since, in fact, favored
a broad construction of the statute.26  Rather than viewing the
statute as an enumeration of various acts which constitute fraud
upon the Government, the courts appear to recognize the congres-
sional intent to protect the functions of the federal government from
frustration and perversion 27-in short, to protect the Government
from fraud. A narrow and technical construction of the statute such
as the two-offense theory in Diogo appears to thwart the intent of
Congress and run counter to the majority of the cases.
Moreover, in the law of civil fraud,28 a concealment can be the
"equivalent" of a false representation where there is a duty to
speak, 29 and a duty to speak can be raised where the concealer has
24 See note 1 supra. The categories of § 1001 include: fraudulent representation,
fraudulent concealment, and use of a fraudulent document.
25 The committee report gives no indication of congressional intent on this point.
H. R. REP. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A80-81 (1948); S. REP'. No. 1620, 80th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1948).
25 Ogden v. United States, 303 F.2d 724, 742 (9th Cir. 1962); Gonzales v. United
States, 286 F.2d 118 (10th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 878 (1961); United States
v. Leviton, 193 F.2d 848, 851 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 946 (1952); United
States v. Gottfried, 165 F.2d 360, 368 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 860 (1948);
United States v. Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190, 205 (D. Md. 1955). Cf. United States v.
Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86 (1941); Bramblett v. United States, 231 F.2d 489 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1015 (1956); United States v. Goldsmith, 108 F.2d 917 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 309 U.S. 678 (1940).
27 United States v. Gilliland, supra note 26, at 92-93.
28 Although this is a criminal statute and as such ought to be strictly construed,
there is considerable authority that principles of civil fraud may apply to criminal
fraud statutes. E.g., Mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 338 (1958): United States v.
Buckner, 108 F.2d 921, 926 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 669 (1940); United States
v. Brown, 79 F.2d 205, 211 (8th Cir. 1933). False claims statute, Rav. STAT. §§ 3490,
5438 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 231 (1958): United States ex rel. Brensilber v. Bausch &
Lomb Optical Co., 131 F.2d 545, 546 (2d Cir. 1942), affirmed by an equally divided
Court, 320 U.S. 711 (1943); United States v. United States Cartridge Co., 95 F. Supp.
384, 394 (E.D. Mo. 1950) (where the court notes the similarity of § 1001, at 394 n.8).
20 R AiTMENT, ToRis § 551 (1938). E.g., Charles Hughes 8& Co. v. SEC, 139
F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944); Equitable Life Ins.
Co. v. Halsey, Stuart & Co., 112 F.2d 302 (7th Cir.), reversed on other grounds, 312
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undertaken to answer the inquiries of another.8 0 Thus, in civil
fraud, when Diogo undertook to answer the inquiry of the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service, he was bound to avoid a deceiving
or misleading response. Wilful failure to do so would constitute
civil fraud, and the theory of the case-whether "false representa-
tion" or "concealment of a material fact"-would be immaterial,
since in this situation the two are equivalent. 81
In the light of these considerations: the Blockburger test, con-
gressional intent and treatment in the courts, and analogous princi-
ples of civil fraud, the unqualified two-offense construction of sec-
tion 1001 seems unsatisfactory. There is no legal distinction be-
tween a false representation and a concealment, and any attempt to
create such a distinction is apt to be misleading. The broad lan-
guage of the Diogo opinion opens the way for needless confusion,
technicality, and uncertainty in prosecutions under this statute.8 2
The practical consequence of the Diogo decision is that hereafter
the prosecuting attorney will probably phrase his indictment in
terms of "concealment of a material fact" regardless of which "of-
fense" he hopes to prove. 3 Whether his own theory of the case is
U.S. 410 (1941); Miller v. National City Bank, 69 F. Supp. 187, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1946);
United States v. Zgrebec, 38 F. Supp. 127, 130 (E.D. Mich. 1941).30 E.g., Parker v. Title & Trust Co., 233 F.2d 505, 510 (9th Cir. 1956); New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Gay, 36 F.2d 634 (10th Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 624 (1931);
Knox v. Anderson, 159 F. Supp. 795, 806 (D. Hawaii 1958); 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 16(c)
(1943).
"'A closely related principle of civil fraud holds that "A statement in a business
transaction which, while stating the truth so far as it goes, the maker knows or
believes to be materially misleading because of his failure to state qualifying matter
is a fraudulent representation." REsrATEmENT, TORTS § 529 (1938) as quoted in
Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Halsey, Stuart & Co., 312 U.S. 410, 425-26 (1941); Strand v.
Librascope, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 743 (E.D. Mich. 1961). It appears from this principle
that in civil fraud a fraudulent representation need not be actually false on its face.
The court apparently gives no attention to this analogous principle when it holds that
an indictment for "false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations," re-
quires proof of actual falsity. (Emphasis added.)
2 Although the broad language of the case seems quite clear, a fairly appealing
limiting argument could be based on the fact that the court does mention an additional
ground for its decision. See note 14 supra. That this may have been the primary
consideration behind all the talk of two distinct offenses is to some degree attested
by the fact that it is this point to which Judge Clark directs a part of his brief but
vigorous dissent. 320 F.2d at 910.
"The prosecutor may choose to include the language of both offenses in his in-
dictment-regardless of the theory. Unfortunately, this practice will provide no
better notice to the accused as to the particulars of his offense than would an indict-
ment for defrauding the Government-which has been criticized as vague or in-
definite. See Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405,
414-36, 441-46 (1959).
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"false representation" or "concealment of a material fact," by charg-
ing the latter, he avoids the burden of having to prove "actual
falsity." If he charges "concealment of a material fact" and proves
all the elements of that offense, the issue of actual falsity need
never be reached.3 4
" Moreover, since the statute makes no distinction between false representations
and concealment of a material fact with respect to seriousness or punishment, the
prosecutor serves no purpose by bearing the added burden of proving actual falsity.
